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Arbitration Case Law Update 2013
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Jill I. Gross
Professor of Law, Director of Legal Skills
Director, Investor Rights Clinic, Pace Law School
May 20, 2013

The U.S. Supreme Court and lower state and federal courts
continue to decide cases under the Federal Arbitration Act
(“FAA”)1 at an astounding rate. This chapter summarizes
Supreme Court opinions over the past year that interpret the FAA,
as well as selected lower court decisions that apply the FAA and
could have an impact on securities arbitration practice.2
I.

U.S. Supreme Court

Since last summer when I authored the Arbitration Law
Update 2012 for PLI, the United States Supreme Court decided
one new arbitration case and heard oral argument on two other
cases.3
A. Separability doctrine
In November 2012, the Supreme Court issued a per
curiam opinion in Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard,4
holding that the FAA preempted a decision by the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma to rule, in the first instance, on the validity of a
covenant not to compete despite the existence of an arbitration
clause.
Nitro-Lift Technologies, a provider of services to
operators of oil and gas wells, entered into confidentiality and
noncompetition agreements with two of its employees,
Respondents Howard and Schneider.5 Those agreements contained
1

9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2013).
Because securities arbitration necessarily “involves commerce” (FAA §
2), courts apply the FAA to issues arising out of securities arbitrations.
See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
3
I will provide updates on these two cases at the program, as they are
likely to be decided after this chapter is submitted for publication but
before the date of the program.
4
133 S.Ct. 500 (2012).
5
Id. at 501-02.
2

2

a broad arbitration clause, delegating to an arbitrator “[a]ny
dispute, difference or unresolved question between Nitro–Lift and
the Employee[s].”6 When the employees quit Nitro-Lift and
started working for competitors, Nitro-Lift demanded arbitration,
alleging breach of the noncompetition agreements.7
Respondents filed suit in state court in Oklahoma, asking
the court to declare the noncompetition agreements unenforceable
under an Oklahoma statute that limits the enforceability of
covenants not to compete.8 The trial court dismissed the
complaint, concluding the dispute was arbitrable. On appeal, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that, in Oklahoma, courts decide
the enforceability of noncompetition agreements, thus ignoring the
arbitration clause. The Oklahoma high court then declared the
noncompetition agreements unenforceable as against public
policy.9
Nitro-Lift appealed to the U.S Supreme Court. The Court
ruled that the Oklahoma high court blatantly and improperly
ignored the FAA separability doctrine, which declares that
arbitrators decide in the first instance the enforceability of

6

Id. at 502.
Id.
8
Id. 15 Okl.St.Ann. § 219A (2012) provides:
A. A person who makes an agreement with an employer,
whether in writing or verbally, not to compete with the employer
after the employment relationship has been terminated, shall be
permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted by
the former employer or in a similar business as that conducted
by the former employer as long as the former employee does not
directly solicit the sale of goods, services or a combination of
goods and services from the established customers of the former
employer.
B. Any provision in a contract between an employer and an
employee in conflict with the provisions of this section shall be
void and unenforceable.
9
133 S.Ct at 502.
7
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contracts containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause, as long as the
challenge is not to the arbitration clause itself.10 In vacating the
decision, the Court harshly reprimanded the Oklahoma high court:
State courts rather than federal courts are most frequently
called upon to apply the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9
U.S.C. § 1 et seq., including the Act's national policy
favoring arbitration. It is a matter of great importance,
therefore, that state supreme courts adhere to a correct
interpretation of the legislation. Here, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court failed to do so. By declaring the
noncompetition agreements in two employment contracts
null and void, rather than leaving that determination to the
arbitrator in the first instance, the state court ignored a
basic tenet of the Act's substantive arbitration law.11
In the end, while the Supreme Court harshly rebuked the
Oklahoma high court, Nitro-Lift offers no new law: it just
reiterates and reaffirms fundamental principles of the Court’s FAA
jurisprudence, including doctrines of broad FAA preemption,
separability, and the power of the arbitrators to decide the
enforceability of contracts containing an arbitration clause.
B. Vindication of statutory rights
Also in November 2012, the Supreme Court granted the
petition for a writ of certiorari in American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant,12 to decide the following question presented:
“Whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts, invoking the
‘federal substantive law of arbitrability,’ to invalidate arbitration
10

See Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446
(2006).
11
Nitro-Lift, 133 S.Ct at 501.
12
667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Amex III”), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 594
(2012).
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agreements on the ground that they do not permit class arbitration
of a federal-law claim.”13
In Amex III, the Second Circuit ruled that a pre-dispute
arbitration clause containing a class action waiver in merchants’
credit card processing agreements was unenforceable because it
precluded plaintiff merchants from vindicating their statutory
rights under the federal antitrust laws.14 Amex III was the third
time the Second Circuit had found that arbitration clause
unenforceable under the “vindicating rights” doctrine, this last time
even after a review of the case in light of the Supreme Court’s
April 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.15
The Court of Appeals reconsidered, in light of AT&T
Mobility, its prior decisions16 that a class action waiver clause in a
13

American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, 2012 WL 3091064, *i (U.S. July 30, 2012).
14
667 F.3d at 219. Under the “vindicating statutory rights” doctrine
derived from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that “so long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action
in the arbitral forum, the [federal] statute [providing that cause of action]
will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function”
(Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 (1985)), a disputant can argue that an arbitration agreement is
unenforceable because an unfair aspect of the arbitration process would
preclude that party from vindicating its statutory rights. Id. at 637; see
also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000)
(recognizing in dicta that, if a party showed that pursuing its statutory
claims through arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, and thus it
could not vindicate its statutory rights, a court could validly refuse to
enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement).
15
131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) (enforcing class action waiver in consumer
services arbitration agreement and preempting state law of
unconscionability).
16
See In Re American Exp. Merch. Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“Amex II”); In Re American Exp. Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.
2009) (“Amex I”). The Court of Appeals reconsidered Amex I in light of
the Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Intern. Corp, 559 U.S. 662, 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010).
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merchants’ credit card agreement was unenforceable under the
FAA because “enforcement of the clause would effectively
preclude any action seeking to vindicate the [plaintiffs’] statutory
rights.”17 The Court of Appeals found that AT&T Mobility did not
alter its prior analysis, which rested on a different ground than that
of AT&T Mobility.18 Rather, the Court of Appeals recognized,
“[h]ere…our holding rests squarely on a ‘vindication of statutory
rights analysis, which is part of the federal substantive law of
arbitrability.’”19 Because plaintiffs in this case demonstrated
through expert testimony that pursuing their statutory claims
individually as opposed to through class arbitration would not be
economically feasible, “effectively depriving plaintiffs of the
statutory protections of the antitrust laws,”20 the Court of Appeals
directed the district court to deny defendant’s motion to compel
arbitration.21
The Court heard oral argument on February 27, 2013.
Since the “vindicating rights” doctrine seemed one of the only
valid exceptions to AT&T Mobility’s broad preemption of state
unconscionability law as applied to class action waivers, the
AMEX III decision will surely be the most important arbitration
law case coming out of the Court this term. Most scholars who
listened to the argument or read the transcript predict that the Court
will rule in favor of American Express on the grounds that

17

Amex I, 554 F.3d at 304.
Amex III, 667 F.3d at 214 (“What Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not
do is require that all class-action waivers be deemed per se enforceable.
That leaves open the question presented on this appeal: whether a
mandatory class action waiver clause is enforceable even if the plaintiffs
are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of enforcement would be
to preclude their ability to bring federal antitrust claims.”).
19
Id. at 213, citing Amex I, 554 F.3d at 320.
20
Id. at 217.
21
Id. at 219. But see Homa v. American Exp. Co., 494 Fed. Appx. 191,
196-98 (3d Cir. 2012) (enforcing class action waiver and rejecting
“vindicating rights” challenge).
18
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plaintiffs’ claim that they will not be able to vindicate their
statutory rights under the antitrust laws is too speculative.22
C. Class arbitration
Only a few weeks after granting certiorari in Amex III, the
Court agreed to hear another FAA-related case, Oxford Health
Plans LLC v. Sutter.23 Sutter follows on the heels of the Court’s
2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,24
which held that courts must construe an arbitration agreement that
is truly “silent” as to class arbitration to mean that the parties did
not authorize arbitrators to conduct class arbitration.
In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court found that the arbitration panel
had “exceeded their powers” within the meaning of FAA §10(a)(4)
by reading into a silent arbitration agreement the parties’ intent to
arbitrate aggregable claims. Notably, however, the parties in StoltNielsen “stipulated that there was ‘no agreement’ on the issue of
class-action arbitration.”25 As a result, the Court conceded that it
had “no occasion to decide what contractual basis may support a
finding that the parties agreed to authorize class-action
arbitration.”26
The arbitrator in Sutter also interpreted a “silent”
arbitration clause to allow class arbitration, but in this case the
parties had not stipulated as to their intention with respect to class
arbitration, so the arbitrator had to discern the parties’ intentions.27

22

See, e.g., Sarah Cole, American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant
Oral Argument Report, ADR Law Prof Blog (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.indisputably.org/?p=4382.
23
675 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 786 (2012).
24
559 U.S. 662, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
25
130 S.Ct. at 1776 n.10.
26
Id.
27
The Sutter clause provided:
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The arbitrator, in his written order, “[f]ram[ed] the question as one
of contract construction,” and described the parties’ arbitration
clause as “’much broader even than the usual broad arbitration
clause;’ it was ‘unique in [his] experience and seem[ed] to be
drafted to be as broad as can be.”28 The arbitrator concluded that
the broad language of “[n]o civil action” in the clause “embrace[d]
all conceivable court actions, including class actions” and the
clause’s second phrase sent “all such disputes” to arbitration.29
Thus, he reasoned, “the clause expressed the parties’ intent to
authorize class arbitration ‘on its face.’”30
The district court and ultimately the Third Circuit
confirmed the arbitrator’s ruling. The Third Circuit reasoned that
Stolt-Nielsen “did not establish a bright line rule that class
arbitration is allowed only under an arbitration agreement that
incants ‘class arbitration’ or otherwise expressly provides for
aggregable procedures.”31 Rather, the case established a “default
rule” that, “[a]bsent a contractual basis for finding that the parties
agreed to class arbitration, an arbitration award ordering that
procedure exceeds the arbitrator’s powers and will be subject to
vacatur under §10(a)(4).32
The Supreme Court heard oral argument on March 25,
2013. The Justices’ questions crystallized the tension between the
two competing policies at stake in this case: should courts defer to

‘No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this
Agreement shall be instituted before any court, and all such
disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in
New Jersey, pursuant to the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association with one arbitrator.’
675 F.3d at 217 (citing App. 55).
28
Id. at 217-18 (citing App. at 47).
29
Id. at 218.
30
Id. (citing App. at 48).
31
Id. at 222.
32
Id.
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an arbitrator’s interpretation of parties’ arbitration agreements,
even if that interpretation seems implausible, or should courts
overturn such interpretations when the arbitrators interpreted the
agreement in an implausible manner, and thus exceeded their
powers?33
A decision in this case likely will close the gap left by
footnote 10 of Stolt-Nielsen and hopefully address once and for all
whether an arbitrator can ever read a silent arbitration clause to
authorize class arbitration.
II.

Notable Administrative Law Decision: FINRA v.
Schwab

The Supreme Court’s seminal April 2011decision in
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion,34 in which it held that the
FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank rule, which
“classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer
contracts as unconscionable,”35 confirmed the strong preemptive
force of the FAA, and reduced consumers’ ability to challenge
class action waivers as unconscionable under state law. As a
result, since AT&T Mobility, companies have been inserting class
action waivers in their consumer agreements, and courts largely
have been enforcing them.36

33

See Steve Vladeck, Argument recap: How much deference do
arbitrators deserve under Stolt-Nielsen?, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 27, 2013),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/argument-recap-how-muchdeference-do-arbitrators-deserve-under-stolt-nielsen/.
34
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). For a detailed discussion of the case, see Jill I.
Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2011, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION
2011, at 205 (Practising Law Institute 2011).
35
AT&T Mobility, 131 S.Ct. at 1746.
36
See, e.g., Muriithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc., 712 F.3d 173 (4th Cir. 2013);
Kilgore v. Keybank, N.A., __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 1458876 (9th Cir. Apr.
11, 2013); Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224, 1226 (11th
Cir. 2012).
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However, one question not addressed by AT&T Mobility is
how courts should resolve challenges to class action waivers on the
grounds that they violate a competing federal law. Indeed, it is
well-established that the mandate of the FAA is not absolute: it
may be “overridden by a ‘contrary congressional command.’”37
While the FAA preemption doctrine requires the broad
displacement of state laws that conflict with the policies
underlying the FAA, courts must turn to other doctrines when
resolving conflicts between the FAA and other federal laws.38
Last year’s chapter detailed the contention of one brokerdealer, FINRA member Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. (“Schwab”),
that the holding of AT&T Mobility applies in the securities context,
and displaces conflicting FINRA rules, which are approved by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.39 In October 2011, Schwab

37

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (quoting
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987)). Courts have been very reluctant this past year to find such a
“contrary congressional command” sufficient to overcome a class action
waiver. See, e.g., Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th
Cir. 2013) (enforcing a class action waiver in the Fair Labor Standards
Act context and stating “our conclusion is consistent with all of the other
courts of appeals that have considered this issue and concluded that
arbitration agreements containing class waivers are enforceable in FLSA
cases”).
38
See, e.g., In the Matter of Eber, 687 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2012)
(affirming bankruptcy court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration on
the grounds that the federal bankruptcy laws displaced the FAA); State of
Wash. v. James River Ins. Co., 292 P.3d 118 (WA Sup. Ct. 2013)
(declaring a mandatory arbitration clause in an insurance contract
unenforceable under a state law that was shielded from FAA preemption
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1012(b)).
39
Jill I. Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2012, in SECURITIES
ARBITRATION 2012, at 233-34 (Practising Law Institute 2012)
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amended its customer agreement to add a class action waiver to the
arbitration clause.40
In response, in early 2012, FINRA Enforcement brought a
disciplinary action against Schwab for including the class action
waiver.41 FINRA charged that requiring customers to waive their
right to bring or participate in a class action violates NASD Rule
3110(f)(4)(A) and (C), and its successor rules FINRA Rule
2268(d)(1) and (3) (effective Dec. 5, 2011). Those rules prohibit
member firms from placing “any condition” in a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement that “limits or contradicts the rules of any
self-regulatory organization,” and “limits the ability of a party to
file any claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules
of the forums in which a claim may be filed under the agreement,”
respectively. FINRA argued that, because Rule 12204(d) of the
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes
addresses the manner in which customers can bring and participate
in class actions against member firms, the forum rules clearly
permit class actions, and Schwab’s class action waiver contradicts
Rule 12204.42
On February 21, 2013, a FINRA hearing panel issued its
decision, finding that Schwab’s actions in inserting the class action
waiver did indeed violate FINRA rules, but that the FAA
precluded FINRA from enforcing its rules against Schwab.43 That

40

SECURITIES ARBITRATION ALERT 2011-38 (Oct. 12, 2011) (reporting
that Schwab inserted a new clause entitled “Waiver of Class Action or
Representative Action” in its Customer Account Agreements).
41
Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing, Department of
Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Disc. Proc. No.
2011029760201, available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@ad/documents/ind
ustry/p125516.pdf (FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 1, 2012).
42
Id.
43
Hearing Panel Decision, Department of Enforcement v. Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc., Disc. Proc. No. 2011029760201, available at
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decision is currently on appeal to the National Adjudicatory
Council and briefing will continue throughout the summer of 2013.
I have argued that the hearing panel’s decision is wrong,
and that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (Dodd-Frank),44 provides the “contrary congressional
command” required by AT&T Mobility and CompuCredit to
displace the FAA.45 In my view, unless reversed on appeal, the
Hearing Panel’s decision deals a crippling blow to the authority of
FINRA and the SEC to adopt arbitration rules that balance the
benefits of arbitration with the need to protect investors.
III.

Notable federal court decisions
A. Defenses to Arbitrability

Litigation about arbitration often results when one party to
a purported arbitration agreement seeks to compel a reluctant party
to arbitrate a dispute. In response to the motion to compel, the
reluctant party can raise several defenses to the arbitrability of the
dispute, including a statutory prohibition, the absence of an
enforceable arbitration agreement (due to contract law doctrines or,
in FINRA arbitration, the claimant is not a “customer” of
respondent), and waiver. Discussed below are some recent federal
court of appeals decisions interpreting these defenses.

http://disciplinaryactions.finra.org/viewdocument.aspx?DocNB=33101
(FINRA Office of Hearing Officers Feb. 21, 2103).
44
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
45
See Barbara Black & Jill Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal
Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1 (2012).
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1. A “contrary congressional command”
If a federal statute has explicitly declared that claims
arising under it are non-arbitrable, then a court must deny a motion
to compel arbitration of those claims. Several federal statutory
schemes establishing rights of action arising under them include
nonarbitrability provisions, including the whistleblower provisions
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).46
§806 of SOX adds protection for and gives a right of
action to “whistleblowers” who report fraud at publicly-traded
companies.47 In §922 of Dodd-Frank, Congress declared that predispute arbitration agreements purporting to require arbitration of
SOX whistleblower claims are not enforceable.48 This past year, a
federal district court applied this ban on arbitrating SOX
whistleblower claims retroactively, thus precluding arbitration of
whistleblower claims that arose even before Dodd-Frank’s
enactment.49 This decision could be helpful to pre-2010
whistleblowers from securities industry firms forced into
arbitration.
2. Was there an enforceable arbitration
agreement?
Before a court will grant a motion to compel arbitration
under the FAA, it must be satisfied that the disputing parties
entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement. Thus,
defenses to contracts generally can be raised in response to a
motion to compel arbitration. For example, this past year, the
Fourth Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration agreement between
home purchasers and a real estate development company due to
46

Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
18 U.S.C. §1514A (2012).
48
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2012).
49
See Wong v. CKX, Inc., 890 F. Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
47
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lack of mutual consideration.50 Applying Maryland law, the Court
of Appeals concluded that consideration for the underlying
contract is not sufficient to constitute consideration for a standalone contract, including an arbitration clause within that
contract.51
However, even if parties did not directly enter into an
arbitration agreement, they still may be able to compel arbitration
of claims arising out of an arbitration agreement between
signatories under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. A
nonsignatory can enforce an arbitration clause with a signatory:
(1) when a signatory must rely on the terms of the written
agreement in asserting its claims against the
nonsignatory or the claims are ‘intimately founded in
and intertwined with’ the underlying contract, and (2)
when the signatory alleges substantially
interdependent and concerted misconduct by the
nonsignatory and another signatory and ‘the
allegations of interdependent misconduct [are][
founded in or intimately connected with the
obligations of the underlying agreement.’52
In Kramer, a putative class action brought by purchasers and
lessees of allegedly defective hybrid cars against Toyota, the
manufacturer, Toyota attempted to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’
claims based on an arbitration agreement in the purchase
50

See Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc., 708 F.3d 599 (4h Cir. 2013).
Id. at 609.
52
See Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir.
2013) (internal citations omitted); see also Escobal v. Celebration Cruise
Operator, Inc., 482 Fed. Appx. 475, 476 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Escobal's
claim against Cruise Line is inextricably intertwined with his claims
against the contract signatory Celebration Cruise Operator. Thus, the
district court properly applied equitable estoppel in requiring Escobal to
arbitrate his claim against Cruise Line.”).
51
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agreements between the plaintiffs and car dealerships. The Ninth
Circuit refused to compel arbitration under the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, finding that plaintiffs’ claims were not
“intimately founded in and intertwined with” the plaintiffs’
purchase agreements, nor were their allegations that Toyota and
the dealerships engaged in a pattern of denial or concealment of
the alleged defects “inextricably bound up with the obligations” in
the purchase agreements.53
Courts of Appeal have likewise rejected several other
attempts by nonsignatories to enforce arbitration agreements
against signatories this past year, on both equitable estoppel54 and
third-party beneficiary55 theories. These cases signal a trend in
courts to reject arbitration of claims other than between or among
signatories to a written arbitration agreement. This trend may have
implications for investors who, for example, have arbitration
agreements with a custodial broker-dealer who is a FINRA
member with few duties to customers but not necessarily with the
investment adviser who controls the account. The investment
adviser is a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement
between the broker-dealer and the investor, but courts may not
permit the investor to compel arbitration with the adviser if it
applies the third-party beneficiary doctrine narrowly or not at all.

53

Kramer, 705 F.3d at 1129-33.
See, e.g., Baldwin v. Cavett, 502 Fed. Appx 350, 356 (5th Cir. 2012); In
re Wholesale Grocery Prod. Antitrust Litig., 707 F.3d 917, 922-23 (8th
Cir. 2013); Branch v. Ottinger, 477 Fed. Appx. 718, 720 (11th Cir. 2012).
55
If a nonsignatory can demonstrate it is a third-party beneficiary of an
arbitration agreement, it can enforce that agreement against signatories.
See Fundamental Admin. Servs., LLC v. Patton, Civ. No. 12-2014, 2012
WL 5992259, *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 2012).
54
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3. Who is a “customer” under FINRA Rule
12200?
In a FINRA customer-initiated arbitration, in the absence
of a pre-dispute arbitration clause, respondents may resist
arbitration on the ground that the claimant is not a “customer” of
the FINRA member firm within the meaning of FINRA Code of
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule 12200. That
rule provides that a FINRA member firm must arbitrate a claim if
“requested by a customer,” “[t]he dispute is between a customer
and a member or associated person of a member; and [t]he dispute
arises in connection with the business activities of the member or
the associated person . . . .”56
Courts continue to interpret Rule 12200 in the context of
respondents’ motions for declaratory and/or injunctive relief on the
grounds that the claimant is not a “customer” within the meaning
of the rule. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals alone has issued
at least four decisions on this issue in the past year.
One case construed the term “associated person” for
purposes of Rule 12200.57 Specifically, it addressed the “novel
question” of “[w]hether a person who is not in a contractual
relationship with a member firm nevertheless can be an ‘associated
person’ of that firm for purposes of FINRA arbitration.”58 In that
case, investors brought arbitration claims against their financial
advisor George Gilbert, Gilbert’s current investment firm,
Waterford Investment Services, Inc. (Waterford), and his prior
firm, Community Bankers Securities, LLC (CBS).59 During the

56

FINRA R. 12200.
See Waterford Inv. Serv., Inc. v. Bosco, 682 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2012).
58
Id. at 354.
59
Notably, the district court found that Waterford was a “’mere
continuation’ of CBS.” Waterford Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Bosco, 2011 WL
57
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time period of the relevant transactions (which turned out to be a
Ponzi scheme), Gilbert sold securities through CBS, but not
Waterford, under an “Independent Associate Agreement.”
To avoid arbitration with the investors, Waterford sought a
declaratory judgment in federal district court that the investors
were not its customers under Rule 12200. The parties did not
dispute that the investor claimants were customers of Gilbert and
that their claims arose out of Gilbert’s business activities. Because
a member firm must arbitrate the claims of its associated person’s
customers, the only issue was whether Gilbert was an associated
person of Waterford during the relevant time period. The court
looked to FINRA Rule 12100(r), which defined a “person
associated with a member” as “a natural person engaged in the
investment banking or securities business who is directly or
indirectly controlling or controlled by a member.” Ultimately, by
examining the close relationship between CBS and Waterford at
the relevant time, including the facts that they shared many
officers, directors and employees, and shared office space and
trading resources, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district
court’s finding that Waterford had “the power and ability to
exercise power” over Gilbert.60 Thus, Gilbert was an associated
person of Waterford at the time of the relevant transactions and
Waterford was required to arbitrate the investors’ claims.
Another case interpreted the definition of “customer” in
the context of an issuer of auction rate securities suing the financial
institutions that advised the issuer and underwrote those issuances.
In January 2013, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's
refusal to enjoin the arbitration claims of a not-for-profit healthcare
organization that had issued auction rate securities against UBS

3820723 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2011), aff'd, 682 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2012)
(quotation omitted).
60
Waterford, 682 F.3d at 354 (internal citations omitted).
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Financial Services, Inc. and Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., both
of which had advised it in connection with the issuance.61 UBS
and Citi argued that the claimant was not its “customer” under
Rule 12200 because its claims “did not relate to a brokerage
account or investment relationship with UBS or Citi.”62
The Court of Appeals rejected that narrow definition,
instead defining the term “customer” as “one, not a broker or
dealer, who purchases commodities or services from a FINRA
member in the course of the member's business activities insofar as
those activities are regulated by FINRA—namely investment
banking and securities business activities.”63 Because UBS and
Citi had provided multiple services to Carilion in connection with
the securities offering and received payment from Carilion for
those services, the court had “little difficulty concluding that
Carilion is such a ‘customer.’”64
In contrast, two subsequent Fourth Circuit cases applied
the Carilion definition of “customer” and ruled that the claimants
were not customers of FINRA members.65 In Silverman, the
circuit court concluded that investors were not “customers” of the
principal distributor and underwriter of bond funds that they
purchased through another broker-dealer.66 In Cary, the circuit
61
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court concluded that investors were not “customers” of Raymond
James Financial Services when they purchased securities on the
recommendation of an attorney who was not affiliated with
Raymond James but merely was a “personal friend and business
acquaintance” of a Raymond James broker.67
Similarly, an Eighth Circuit court rejected investors’
claims that they were “customers” of a broker-dealer, Berthel
Fisher & Co., which had managed an offering of securities that
were sold directly to the investors by other “selling” brokerdealers. The Court of Appeals concluded that, because Berthel
Fisher or its associated persons had not provided investment or
brokerage services directly to the investors, and the investors had
no relationship with Berthel Fisher, the investors could not compel
arbitration of their claims against that broker-dealer.68
These conflicting decisions demonstrate that courts
struggle to come up with a coherent definition of “customer” under
Rule 12200, leaving industry firms with a lack of clarity and
predictability as to who might be able to compel arbitration of their
disputes.
4. Waiver
Litigants seeking to avoid arbitration have sometimes been
successful asserting the defense of waiver to a motion to compel
arbitration. This is a claim that one party to an arbitration clause
has waived its right to arbitrate based on conduct in parallel
litigation. While the waiver test varies slightly among the federal
circuits, courts typically consider factors such as: (1) the time
elapsed from commencement of litigation to the request for
arbitration; (2) the amount and nature of litigation, including

67
68

Cary, 709 F.3d at 386.
Berthel Fisher & Co. Fin’l Serv., Inc., 695 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2012).
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substantive motions and discovery; and (3) prejudice to the party
opposing arbitration.69
This past year, the Eleventh Circuit held that Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (for itself and its predecessor Wachovia Bank, N.A.)
waived its right to compel arbitration of class action claims
alleging that it charged its checking account customers unlawful
overdraft fees.70 In the proceedings below, Wells Fargo had
declined two invitations by the district court to move to compel
arbitration. Soon after the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T
Mobility, however, Wells Fargo “reversed course” and moved to
compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims on an individual basis, but
the district court denied the motion on the grounds of waiver.71
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Wells
Fargo’s conduct met its two-part waiver test: it had acted
inconsistently with its arbitration right by “substantially invok[ing]
the litigation machinery prior to demanding arbitration,” and its
actions “in some way prejudiced the other party.”72 In assessing
prejudice, the circuit court considered the substantial discovery
that the parties already had conducted in the litigation, and at
substantial cost.73
The Court of Appeals also rejected Wells Fargo’s
argument that it would have been futile to move to compel
arbitration initially on the grounds that the relevant arbitration
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See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp.,
376 Fed. Appx. 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP
v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“By this opinion we
alert the bar in this Circuit that failure to invoke arbitration at the first
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clause had a class action waiver that arguably was unenforceable
pre-AT&T Mobility. Instead, the Court of Appeals found that
AT&T Mobility “established no new law” and Wells Fargo could
have made the same arguments that AT&T successfully made in
its case.74
This decision signals that financial services institutions
that have allowed class actions to go forward in the past on the
assumption that class action waivers rendered their arbitration
clauses unenforceable likely will be found to have waived their
right to compel arbitration of those class claims on an individual
basis.
B. Vacatur of Awards
Since the Court’s 2008 decision in Hall Street Assoc.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), it is well-established
that FAA §10(a) provides the sole grounds for vacating an
arbitration award under federal law. Appellate courts have
continued to interpret the scope of those grounds over the past
year.
1. Procured by fraud
In a decision important to the career of a well-known
securities arbitration expert, Dr. Craig McCann, the Fifth Circuit
reversed a district court’s decision to vacate a FINRA arbitration
award on the ground that, inter alia, it was procured by fraud
within the meaning of FAA §10(a)(1).75 The district court had
concluded that Dr. McCann, who had testified as an expert at the
arbitration hearing, “knowingly testified to incorrect numbers, and
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‘the [arbitration] panel based its damages calculations on [Dr.
McCann’s knowingly false testimony.”76
The Court of Appeals concluded that the district court
erred in vacating the award under §10(a)(1). The Court noted that
Dr. McCann had provided revised calculations to Morgan
Keegan’s lawyers in the context of another arbitration before the
issuance of the award in Garrett. In addition, Dr. McCann’s
calculations relied on Morgan Keegan’s own internal pricing
numbers. Had Morgan Keegan performed any due diligence, the
appellate court concluded, it could have discovered any alleged
fraud on its own, and thus could not meet its burden of proof on
the three-prong test for vacatur on this ground.77 Thus, the Court
of Appeals “expressly vacate[d] the finding that Dr. McCann
committed fraud” and reinstated the arbitration award. 78
2. Evident Partiality
Losing parties to arbitration awards can also seek vacatur
pursuant to FAA § 10(a)(2) if they show “evident partiality” in the
arbitrators. Courts have had difficulty developing a test for
“evident partiality,” since the Supreme Court’s only decision under
that subsection is the 45-year old decision in Commonwealth
Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co.,79 and that case yielded
plurality and concurring opinions that are difficult to synthesize.
Most circuits follow the test set forth by the Second Circuit in
Morelite Constr. v. New York City Dist. Council Carpenters Ben.
Funds,80 where the court held that “evident partiality” is “where a
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reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was
partial to one party to the arbitration.” 81
This past year, the Third Circuit adopted the Second
Circuit’s test.82 Under that test, the circuit court in Freeman
concluded that an arbitrator who was formerly a judge did not
demonstrate “evident partiality” by failing to disclose she: (1)
received small donations to her former judicial campaign from the
minority owner of the prevailing party in the arbitration and some
of its top-level employees; and (2) taught a seminar on labor law
with the prevailing party’s senior employment attorney.83
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit vacated an award on the
ground of evident partiality under the same test in an arbitration
arising out a contract between an artist and an art dealer.84 There,
the parties agreed to a tri-partite panel, and the neutral arbitrator
selected by the party-appointed arbitrator was Mark Kowalsky.
After almost five years and 50 hearing days of the arbitration,
Kowalsky disclosed to the artist-claimant that the dealerrespondent as well as its party-appointed arbitrator had both
retained Kowalsky’s law firm for other lucrative litigation matters.
Subsequent procedural and substantive rulings by Kowalsky in the
arbitration all favored the respondent, including the final award.85
The circuit court concluded that “[claimant] established a
81
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convergence of undisputed facts that, considered together, show a
motive for Kowalsky to favor the Whites and multiple, concrete
actions in which he appeared actually to favor them.”86 The
appellate court’s opinion harshly criticized Kowalsky for his
actions, declaring that “[a] party who pays a neutral arbitrator to
prepare for, and then sit through, nearly 50 days of hearing over a
five-year period, deserves better treatment than this.”87
3. Exceeding powers
Another ground of vacatur under the FAA is that the
arbitrators exceeded their powers within the meaning of §10(a)(4).
Late last year, a Third Circuit court reversed a district court’s
vacatur of a FINRA award on this ground.88 There, a financial
advisor sought to overturn an award to pay back her former
employer, Merrill Lynch, amounts based on a promissory note she
signed when she started employment. The district court vacated
the award on the ground that the arbitrators “irrationally
constru[ed] the parties’ arrangements” and the impact on those
arrangements of a settlement of an ERISA action that the broker
had brought against Merrill Lynch.89
The Court of Appeals held that, to prove arbitrators
exceeded their powers under §10(a)(4), a losing party must show
that the arbitrators “fashion[ed] an award that cannot ‘be rationally
derived from the agreement between the parties or from the
parties’ submissions to the arbitrators’ or when the terms of the
arbitration award itself ‘are completely irrational.’”90 The court
found that there was some support in the record for the arbitrators’
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interpretation of the financial arrangements. Moreover, even if
that interpretation is “open to criticism, ‘[a court] may not overrule
an arbitrator simply because [the court] disagree[s].’”91 Because
the Third Circuit concluded that the panel’s decision “can be
rationally derived from the parties’ agreements and submissions to
the panel,” it did not exceed its powers. 92
In the Garrett case discussed above in section III.B.1., the
Fifth Circuit also reversed the district court’s vacatur of the award
on the ground that the panel had exceeded its powers under FAA
§10(a)(4) by arbitrating derivative claims and claims brought by
claimants who were not “customers” of Morgan Keegan. The
Fifth Circuit ruled that, because a FINRA panel has the power
under FINRA Rule 12409 to “interpret and determine the
applicability of all provisions under the [FINRA Customer] Code,”
the arbitrators’ decision to arbitrate those claims could not have
exceeded its powers.93
Finally, two state courts in the past year reminded FINRA
parties that arbitrators do not exceed their powers by awarding
attorney’s fees because FINRA rules provide FINRA arbitrators
with the authority to award attorney’s fees under applicable law.94
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These decisions collectively reflect that long-standing law that
arbitrators have broad powers to award legal and equitable relief,
as long as the parties’ arbitration agreement vests such power in
the arbitrators.
4. Manifest Disregard of the Law
Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.95 that parties to an arbitration agreement
cannot contractually expand the judicial grounds of review of an
award under the FAA, the circuit courts have split on whether an
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid
ground to vacate an arbitration award. The Supreme Court
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.96 The circuit split continues, as follows:


The Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits
acknowledge the continued vitality of the “manifest
disregard” ground of vacatur.97

specifically authorize an award of attorney’s fees, and failed to object to
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The Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have expressly
ruled that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur
ground.98
The First and D.C. Circuits have addressed “manifest
disregard” subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.99
The Third and Tenth Circuits have expressly declined to
address the issue.100

For those courts that still recognize this ground of vacatur,
they often note that it is virtually impossible to determine whether
the panel manifestly disregarded the law in the absence of a
reasoned or explained award.101 This fact is particularly relevant
to FINRA arbitration, because parties have the right to jointly
request an explained award under FINRA Rule 12904(g) and
13904(g). In Murray, the Sixth Circuit noted that, because
claimant never sought an explained award, “[h]e therefore has no
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one but himself to blame for our inability to assess his manifestdisregard argument.”102
IV.

Notable State Court Decisions

Because the state courts, like the federal courts, also
continue to publish decisions under the FAA at a rapid rate, I could
not even begin to cover important state court decisions in the
arbitration law area. However, one recent decision caught my eye,
as it could mean trouble for FINRA arbitration if other
jurisdictions adopt its reasoning.
In April 2013, a Tennessee appellate court refused to
enforce a pre-dispute arbitration clause in a brokerage firm’s
account agreement with a customer on the grounds that the
customer did not sign the arbitration agreement, and, in any event,
it was unconscionable under Tennessee law.103 The court also
affirmed the trial court’s finding that the customer was
fraudulently induced to enter into the customer agreement which
contained the arbitration clause.104
In Webb, plaintiff Franda Webb sued the broker-dealer
affiliate of her bank in circuit court in Knox County, Tennessee,
alleging it unsuitably recommended she use funds set aside for the
special educational needs of her severely disabled son to purchase
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Lehman Brothers bonds. She alleged she was pressured to
purchase $300,000 of the bonds (which were rendered largely
worthless when Lehman filed for bankruptcy later that year) the
same day as the recommendation, as she was told they were a
“one-day opportunity.”105 She had little time to review the account
application to open the new brokerage account (the funds were in
her bank account). She testified that she was not asked to sign an
account agreement (which contained an arbitration clause
designating FINRA as the forum) and had never seen or discussed
an arbitration agreement with the broker.106 Other facts that
emerged in the hearing on the broker’s motion to compel
arbitration suggest that no arbitration agreement was found in her
customer file at the brokerage firm.107
The appellate court agreed with the district court’s
conclusions that the firm did not prove that Ms. Webb signed the
arbitration agreement,108 and, even if she had, it was unenforceable
as an unconscionable contract of adhesion.109 The appellate court
agreed with the trial court that the following factors are relevant to
a determination of unconscionability of this agreement under
Tennessee law:
 The arbitration clause was part of a contract of adhesion;
 The arbitration clause was on page 11 of a 14-page
account agreement;
 The arbitration procedures were not set forth in a separate
stand-alone document;
 The arbitration clause did not tell the customer how to
initiate arbitration and was misleading;
 Plaintiff was pressured to sign the paperwork quickly;
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The jury trial waiver language was printed in the same font
size, type and color as the rest of the agreement;
The likely arbitration fees would be “oppressive.”110

The appellate court also noted that Ms. Webb claimed she was
fraudulently induced into signing the account agreement, and,
under Tennessee law, fraudulent inducement claims are not
arbitrable.111
Most courts that have previously considered similar
challenges to arbitration agreements in broker-dealers’ customer
agreements have rejected claims of unconscionability in part
because the language and formatting of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in FINRA member firms’ customer agreements is
prescribed by FINRA Rule 2268, and FINRA’s arbitration rules
are subject to regulatory approval. However, it appears that the
arbitration clause that the brokerage firm used in this case did not
meet the requirements of FINRA Rule 2268. Thus, it is unlikely
that this decision will lead to wide-scale invalidation of arbitration
clauses in customer agreements.
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court answered a question
“of great public importance” certified to it from a lower court
regarding the applicability of statutes of limitation in securities
arbitration.112 The Supreme Court of Florida quashed that holding,
and concluded that statutes of limitation do apply in arbitration,
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reasoning that an arbitration is a “civil action or proceeding”
within the meaning of the statute.113
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